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I respond to three points of criticism that have been raised against
the concept of meta-empirical confirmation. I argue that meta-
empirical confirmation can be set up in a coherent way and is suf-
ficiently discriminating for rendering it a non-trivial indicator of a
theory’s viability. Moreover, I argue that acknowledging the signif-
icance of meta-empirical confirmation provides an argument for the
pursuit of alternative research programs rather than for their suppres-
sion.
1 Introduction
It has been argued in Dawid (2013), Dawid (2006, 2007, 2009, 2016, 2018,
2019) and Dawid et al. (2015) that three arguments of non-empirical confir-
mation were capable of significantly increasing trust in a scientific theory’s
viability in the absence of empirical confirmation. In this discussion note, I re-
spond to three points of criticism recently presented by Cristin Chall (2018),
Lee Smolin (2014) and Daniele Oriti (2019), which are directed specifically
at individual arguments of non-empirical confirmation. I will not be able to
discuss all points made in the three papers. I will focus on one core point in
each case, which in my understanding represents the most important issue
raised in the given text.1
1Further critical discussion of the approach of non-empirical confirmation (some of
which I have engaged with elsewhere) can be found for example in Ellis and Silk (2014),
Ellis (2017), Cabrera (2018), Dardashti (2019), Hossenfelder (2019), Menon (2019) and
Rovelli (2019).
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2 Zooming in on Three Arguments of Meta-
Empirical Confirmation
The concept of non-empirical theory assessment denotes lines of reasoning
that aim to generate a significant degree of trust in a theory’s viability in the
absence of empirical confirmation. While Dawid (2013) singles out a small set
of specific arguments that can be particularly powerful tools of non-empirical
confirmation, it does not rule out the existence of other forms of significant
non-empirical theory assessment. Recently, a wider range of such strategies
has been addressed in the literature (see Peebles (2020)2). In this light, the
present paper will use the more specific term ”meta-empirical confirmation”
to denote specifically the three arguments of non-empirical confirmation dis-
cussed in Dawid (2013) and closely related arguments. I define arguments of
meta-empirical confirmation as arguments that increase the trust in a the-
ory’s viability by inferring limitations to scientific underdetermination from
observations about the way the scientific research process has played out.
Those observations are about the world but don’t amount to empirical evi-
dence for the theory because they are not of the kind that can be predicted
by the theory in question.
Scientists deploy three specific arguments of meta-empirical confirmation
when evaluating their theories in the absence of sufficient empirical confir-
mation: i) The no alternatives argument (NAA): Scientists tend to trust a
theory if they observe that, despite considerable efforts, no alternative the-
ory that can account for the corresponding empirical regime is forthcoming.
ii) The unexpected explanation argument (UEA): Scientists tend to trust a
theory if they observe that the theory turns out to be capable of explaining
significantly more than what it was built to explain. iii) The meta-inductive
argument (MIA): Scientists tend to have increased trust in a theory that ful-
fills the first or the first two criteria if it is their understanding that previous
theories in their research field that satisfied those criteria had usually turned
out empirically successful once tested.
As indicated above, these arguments are based on assessing the spectrum
of possible alternatives to the theory in question. In each of the arguments,
the meta-level observation about the research process serves as an indicator
2In his history of modern cosmology, James Peebles suggests that non-empirical theory
assessment has been of substantial importance in the field. He identifies a number of cases
where non-empirical theory assessment played an important role in endorsing cosmological
theories and hypotheses. Peebles uses a broad notion of non-empirical assessment that can
in part be related to the specific arguments discussed in Dawid (2013) but goes substan-
tially beyond them, including arguments of conceptual cogency as well as arguments of
elegance and simplicity.
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that there is a scarcity of possible alternatives to the given theory. If a
scientist has plausible reasons to infer from observations about the research
process that possible conceptual alternatives to a known theory are probably
very scarce or absent, this provides an epistemic basis for trusting that theory.
3 First Criticism: Arguments of Non-
empirical confirmation are structurally
flawed.
Cristin Chall (2018) argues that UEA and MIA are structurally flawed. Chall
starts his argument against UEA by claiming that ”the UEA is essentially a
non-empirical version of the no miracles argument” (Chall 2018, p132). On
that basis, he argues that the significance of UEA is threatened by the pos-
sibility that unexpected explanatory interconnections could also be provided
by a more fundamental theory than the one supposedly supported by UEA.
Chall then asserts that Dawid (2013) counters the described threat in the
case of string theory by recourse to a final theory claim: if the theory is final,
no more fundamental theory exists. Based on this reconstruction of UEA,
Chall argues against the argument’s validity: UEA is deployed to establish a
theory’s viability; a final theory argument can only be established based on
the assumption that the given theory is viable; therefore, if UEA itself relies
on a final theory claim, the line of reasoning is viciously circular. Moreover,
an UEA that is applicable only to theories that generate a final theory claim
is irrelevant for most scientific reasoning.
With regard to MIA, Chall claims that the argument is incoherent if the
alleged meta-inductive support is based on the success of theories to which
the theory under scrutiny is a successor theory. Chall points out that the
agreement of the predecessor theory’s predictions with the data needs to be
retained by any viable successor theory (in some low energy limit of that
successor theory). Therefore, the agreement between that data and the pre-
decessor theory always amounts to empirical confirmation (accommodation)
of the successor theory. But if the agreement between the predecessor theory
and the data has already been fully factored in as empirical confirmation, it
cannot provide additional meta-empirical evidence for the successor theory’s
viability.
Given that string theory is a universal theory, any empirically viable
theory in high energy physics deals with physics covered by string theory and
thus must be its predecessor theory in Chall’s sense. Therefore, Chall argues,
MIA is in principle inapplicable to string theory. Moreover, he claims that
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most good cases of comparable theories that could enter an MIA argument
are predecessor theories, which renders MIA mostly inapplicable.
Chall’s criticisms are based on an insufficient appreciation of two core
elements of meta-empirical confirmation: (i) the distinction between local
and global underdetermination, and (ii) the distinction between the role of
experimental data at the ground level and at the meta-level.
Chall’s view of UEA as a non-empirical version of the no-miracles argu-
ment (NMA) ignores an important difference between the two arguments:
they aim to support substantially different claims. NMA is deployed in sup-
port of scientific realism. In asserting a theory’s approximate truth, scientific
realism makes the global claim that the theory will never be replaced by a
successor that contradicts the theory’s core ontic commitments. UEA, to the
contrary, is a local argument. It is deployed to support a theory’s viability
within a given empirical horizon. If the theory gets superseded at a higher
energy scale that lies beyond that empirical horizon, the local viability claim
supported by UEA remains intact. The possibility of a more fundamental
theory whose characteristic empirical implications lie beyond the considered
empirical horizon therefore does not threaten UEA. Thus no final theory
claim is needed to block any such threat. UEA’s viability does not depend
on a final theory claim.
What does threaten UEA (see Dawid 2013, Chapter 3.1) is the possible
existence of a principle that is more general than the theory under scrutiny
and already delivers the unexpected explanation. If such an underlying prin-
ciple is instantiated not only by the theory under scrutiny but also by a wider
group of alternative theories about the given intended domain, the UEA for
each of the individual theories that instantiate the principle falls apart. Only
one of the alternative theories that instantiate the underlying principle will
be viable. The explanatory success achieved by the others arises because
they instantiate the same underlying principle as the viable theory.
As pointed out in Dawid (2013, Chapter 3.1), this threat cannot be coun-
tered within the context of UEA. It can be controlled, however, by deploying
MIA and/or NAA in conjunction with UEA. NAA can indicate that the
chances for an alternative theory that instantiates the same underlying prin-
ciple are low. MIA can indicate that strong cases of UEA have worked well
in the field despite the threat of underlying principles. None of these ar-
guments can fully remove the problem underlying principles pose for UEA.
But they can reduce the severity of the problem. This is one example of the
ways in which mutual reinforcement between the three arguments of MEC
can achieve significant confirmation while the individual arguments are of
insufficient strength if viewed in isolation.
Chall’s argument thus goes wrong in two ways. His analysis of the mecha-
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nism of UEA ignores the important point that the significance of UEA cannot
be argued for without reference to one or both other kinds of MEC. More-
over, his argument for the need of a final theory claim as a foundation for
UEA is based on the erroneous understanding that UEA aims to support a
global (realist) claim.3
Let us now move on to Chall’s second argument, which is directed against
MIA. In order to see why the argument fails, it is crucial to understand
the structural difference between ground level observations E and meta-level
observations F. E, if confirming, denotes empirical data that happen to be
in agreement with theory H’s predictions. The corresponding F (in the MIA
case) denotes the observation that H had been without known alternatives
for a considerable time despite intense search for alternatives and then ended
up being empirically confirmed by data E.
Chall is right that the agreement between a predecessor theory’s predic-
tions and data E needs to be retained by a successor theory. Therefore,
once one has checked that the successor theory can reproduce the empiri-
cal predictions of its empirically successful predecessor in some low energy
limit, E indeed must not be counted a second time as independent evidence
for the successor theory. Meta-level evidence F, however, is not of a kind
that can be retained by the successor theory. F represents a contingent fact
about the way in which the research process played out with respect to the
development and testing of the predecessor theory. That contingent fact is
neither predicted by the predecessor nor by the successor theory. The fact
that the successor theory has its predecessor as an effective theory is entirely
independent from the question whether or not the historical contingencies of
the development and testing of that predecessor amount to F-type evidence.
Therefore, F can have confirmation value for the successor theory beyond the
observation that the predecessor theory is consistent with data E. Contrary
to Chall’s claim, MIA thus can very well be applied to successor theories.
To conclude, neither of Chall’s two criticisms poses problems for meta-
empirical confirmation once one adequately accounts for the full structure of
the argument.
3One should note that final theory claims can indeed further strengthen meta-empirical
confirmation (see Dawid 2013, p153f). They are not necessary, however, for making
UEA+NAA+MIA significant and work in a different way than Chall suggests.
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4 Second criticism: Meta-empirical confir-
mation is too easy to achieve
Lee Smolin (2014) raises a number of issues regarding the status of meta-
empirical confirmation. I want to focus on one central point of criticism:
according to Smolin, meta-empirical confirmation is so flexible that scien-
tists with a sufficient degree of ingenuity can always use it to support the
theory they prefer. As an example, Smolin aims to demonstrate that loop
quantum gravity (LQG) can be confirmed meta-empirically just as well as
string theory. He claims that all three arguments of meta-empirical theory
confirmation can be deployed also for confirming LQG.
Smolin views LQG and string theory as rival approaches that can both be
supported by a no-alternatives argument if one adds specific requirements:
being a fully unified description of all interactions in the case of string theory
and manifest background independence in the case of LQG. While the former
requirement is not met by LQG, the latter is not met by a perturbative
approach to string theory.
In order to develop his argument, Smolin needs to make two problematic
steps, however. First, he shifts the level of analysis from the level of theories
to the level of research programs. Second, he assumes that methodological
preference can provide a basis for NAA.
A research program amounts to deploying a given set of principles and
concepts in a given research field. Within the research program, theories are
being developed that aim to make testable empirical predictions. It is fair
to say that LQG and string theory represent rivaling research programs that
choose different strategies for addressing the problem of quantum gravity.
LQG focuses on the quantization of gravity while string physics approaches
the question based on a universal theory of all interactions.
While research programs may be more or less successful, they don’t get
confirmed or disconfirmed, because no empirical predictions can be deduced
from them. What can get confirmed is an individual theory. Therefore, a
NAA in favor of string theory or LQG, must confirm them as theories. Even
though neither LQG nor string theory have been fully developed and their
spectra of empirical predictions are unknown, it seems possible to treat them
as theories. In both cases, the posits that determine the approach seem
specific enough to justify the expectation that, if the conceptual implications
of those posits could be fully spelled out, this would specify a theory with a
well defined class of empirical predictions in an unequivocal way.
If understood as theories in that sense, however, string theory and LQG
do not constitute theories about the same class of phenomena. String theory
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is, in virtue of its core posits, a theory of all interactions. LQG, as it stands,
is a theory about quantized gravity. LQG may some day in the future be
developed into a theory that describes all interactions. If that can be done,
the resulting theory would play out within the LQG research program but
require additional posits and therefore constitute a different theory than the
one investigated today. Such a theory, if it did not merge with string the-
ory and covered the observed phenomenology of high energy physics in an
explanatorily sufficiently satisfactory way, would indeed amount to a rival
theory to string theory. But this prospect for a future theory within the
LQG research program must not be mistaken for the theory of LQG that
can be pinned down today. Viewed at the level of currently identifiable the-
ories, string theory therefore has the more extensive intended domain than
LQG.
It follows that, while string theory is an alternative to LQG as a theory
of quantum gravity, LQG today does not constitute an alternative to string
theory as a theory of all interactions. A no-alternatives argument therefore
can be applied to string theory without relying on the requirement that
the description of all interactions be fully unified. All that is needed is the
specification of the theory’s intended domain: string theory is claimed to be
the only known theory that covers all known interactions.
While string theory therefore can find support from a NAA based on
specifying the theory’s intended empirical domain, LQG can only find such
support based on an additional requirement that disqualifies string theory.4
Smolin suggests the requirement of manifest background independence. In
order to understand whether introducing a requirement of this kind is ac-
ceptable, we need to discuss an aspect of NAA that, though implicit in the
way the argument has been presented in Dawid (2013), may not have been
sufficiently emphasized.
An epistemically relevant no-alternatives claim needs to be based on a
specified class of physical phenomena (such as the class of all known inter-
actions in the case of string theory) that allegedly cannot be represented by
an alternative theory. Once such a class of phenomena has been specified,
a no-alternative claim can be justified in the following way: Assuming that
science works at all in the given context, there must be a scientific theory
that can account for the given class of phenomena. Therefore, if only one
scientific theory can account for the given class of phenomena, that theory
must be viable.
4For the sake of the argument, we set aside the point that LQG is just one of a range of
approaches of quantizing gravity in a manifestly background independent way that haven’t
been shown to be physically equivalent.
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Manifest background independence does not denote a class of phenomena.
Rather, it constitutes a methodological choice. A class of phenomena that
needs to be accounted for by a theory amounts to empirical data that, based
on the scientists’ understanding of the respective field, is significant and lies
within the theory’s intended domain. A methodological choice denotes a
decision as to which conceptual characteristics a scientist wants her theory
or her theory’s construction method to have. If a scientist concedes that a
theory does not account for a certain class of phenomena, she narrows down
the theory’s intended domain. If a scientist discards a methodological choice,
she merely widens the spectrum of possible theories she is thinking about.
Manifest background independence denotes a prescription regarding the
method of constructing a theory of quantum gravity. Perturbative string
theory, by perturbing around a given spatiotemporal background, does not
adhere to this prescription. It is clear, however, that - if there is a consistent
string theory at all - i) spacetime fully emerges from the dynamics of string
theory5 and ii) no aspect of spacetime that would be accounted for by LQG
lies outside the intended domain of string theory. Therefore, forsaking man-
ifest background independence when analyzing string theory perturbatively
amounts to a methodological choice and does not imply that string theory
narrows down, in comparison to manifestly background independent LQG,
the class of phenomena that fall into its intended domain.
Any attempt to build a no-alternatives case based on a methodological
choice immediately faces a regress problem, however: in order to assess the
significance of such a NAA, one needs to assess the probability that other
theories can successfully represent the phenomena of quantum gravity with-
out making the choice of manifest background independence. Since there is
no good way of assigning probabilities to methodological choices, the corre-
sponding no alternatives argument deflates to a mere statement of method-
ological preference and provides no basis for assessing the relevant spectrum
of unconceived alternatives. Therefore, contrary to Smolin’s claim, the con-
dition of manifest background independence cannot be used fruitfully in a
NAA.
The lack of a genuine NAA for LQG also substantially weakens the basis
for a MIA for the theory, since a MIA acquires strength only in conjunction
with a no-alternatives case.
Smolin also discusses ways in which the argument of unexpected expla-
nation (UEA) applies to LQG. There is no reason to deny that unexpected
explanation can arise in LQG. To the extent it does, it amounts to non-
empirical theory confirmation for LQG. Specific unexpected explanatory in-
5See (Huggett and Vistarini 2015) for a philosophical analysis of this point.
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terconnections that arise for both string theory and LQG would only have
reduced confirmation value for each theory, however, since their occurrence
in different theoretical approaches would suggest that they are related to a
deeper characteristic of theorizing about quantum gravity rather than to an
individual theory.
Assessing the substance and significance of unexpected explanations pro-
vided by a specific theory, be it string theory or LQG, is a matter of careful
analysis. This is not the place to carry out such an investigation. It is my
understanding that the complex and far-reaching web of unexpected expla-
nations encountered in the context of string theory is not matched by what
one finds in the case of LQG. But be this as it may, the physicist’s careful
assessment of the extent of unexpected explanations must provide the basis
for assessing UEA’s significance. To the extent LQG justifies an UEA in its
favor after careful consideration, this would indeed generate MEC support
for LQG. It would not be easily won epistemic support, however.6
To conclude, NAA is not applicable to LQG, which in turn substantially
weakens the basis for applying MIA. UEA might be applicable to some extent
but it is doubtful whether its strength is comparable to the string theory
case. Smolin’s attempt to generate substantial MEC for LQG fails due to
the specific requirements of epistemically significant MEC.
5 Third Criticism: The No Alternatives Ar-
gument Makes Scientific Thinking Nar-
rower
Oriti (2019) argues that MEC is harmful to the breadth and multifaceted
nature of scientific thinking. Oriti agrees that MEA is frequently used by
scientists and plays a productive role in establishing trust in the stability of
empirically well-confirmed theories. He argues, however, that NAA, which
sits at the very center of MEA type reasoning, cannot be reliable in the
6As pointed out early in this paper, significant MEC requires at least two types of MEC.
In the absence of an NAA argument in favor of LQG, the significance of UEA in the given
case could be established in two ways. First, while the existence of one alternative to LQG
(i. e. string theory) substantially weakens MIA, it does not fully destroy it. Second, MIA
type reasoning could also be based on unexpected explanation rather than the number
of known alternatives as a criterion for selecting the ensemble of theories based on which
the meta-inductive argument is run. Due to the complexity of evaluating UEA in each
individual case, it seems far more difficult to extract a powerful MIA on this basis, however.
Any meaningful MIA on that basis would require very strong UEA indeed.
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absence of empirical confirmation and merely serves as an ill-founded justi-
fication for abandoning the quest for alternative approaches.
Oriti’s line of reasoning can be divided into two parts. First, he argues
that there are no cases in the history of science where a theory remained ab-
solutely without alternatives before empirical testing. Therefore, he claims,
NAA is, strictly speaking, never applicable. In cases where no alternatives
claims are actually being made, they are based on additional requirements,
such as methodological preferences, criteria of rigor, or the extent to which
alternatives are fully developed. These additional criteria, Oriti argues, can-
not provide a reliable foundation for NAA because their epistemic relevance
is questionable.
On that basis, Oriti argues in a second step that NAA is mainly deployed
by dominating research programs to discredit their less well-established ri-
vals. This mechanism, Oriti argues, threatens the flexibilty and width of
scientific reasoning that is needed for finding and developing the most ade-
quate theories. Oriti therefore proposes a methodological principle he takes
to be opposed to NAA, which he calls the principle of proliferation: construct
as many alternative theories as possible and use them together as the object
of empirical testing. Oriti suggests that, rather than aiming for NAA, one
should follow the principle of proliferation to optimize the process of scientific
theory building.
I will respond to Oriti at three levels. At a conceptual level, I will argue
that Oriti’s distinction between ”good” NAA in the presence of empirical
confirmation and ”bad” NAA without empirical confirmation is not tenable.
At a historical level, I will argue that quite some cases of successful NAA
can be found if one does not adhere to an idealized understanding of what
real-life NAA looks like. At a strategic level, I will point out that NAA is
more supportive of Oriti’s core agenda of instigating pluralism than he takes
it to be.
Oriti draws a fundamental distinction between the context of empirical
confirmation, where NAA can be helpful by generating trust in the predictive
reliability of the empirically confirmed theory, and the case of non-empirical
confirmation, where this is not possible. This rigid distinction is problematic
in a number of ways.
First, the exclusive focus on the value of pluralism in the absence of
empirical confirmation disregards a substantial debate in the philosophy of
science on the allegedly underrated importance of pluralism in contexts of
strong empirical confirmation. Hasok Chang (see e.g. 2010) has made the
case that the decision as to whether or not empirical confirmation licenses
the full endorsement of a theory or research program and the conclusive
rejection of its alternative often depends on a complex web of influences
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and considerations that reach far beyond the simple comparison between
a theory’s predictions and the data. Chang moreover argues that theory
pluralism is conducive to scientific progress even at a stage when one theory
seems decisively favored by the data.
Translated into the language of MEC, Chang in effect argues that the con-
clusiveness of NAA type reasoning in the presence of empirical confirmation
has been overrated by scientists and philosophers of science alike. Whether
or not one wants to fully subscribe to Chang’s evaluation of the specific case
studies he discusses7, his analysis demonstrates that striking the balance be-
tween the merits of pluralism and the efficiency of focusing on one research
program is a nontrivial process even in cases where empirical confirmation
abounds.
Once one is willing to acknowledge this point, however, the difference be-
tween the role of NAA in cases of empirical confirmation and in cases of MEC
looks decidedly less substantial. In neither case, the judgement that a theory
or research program is not a serious alternative is absolute and clear cut.
In both cases, concluding that a theory is without alternatives is productive
and helpful for focusing research power on the most promising conceptual
development, but also potentially damaging in discouraging investigations
that in the end would be important and conducive to scientific progress after
all. This does not mean that NAA is equally strong or equally justified in
both contexts. It means, however, that acknowledging the productive role of
NAA in cases of empirical confirmation makes it difficult to deny as a mat-
ter of principle that NAA can be conducive to scientific progress in specific
circumstances where empirical confirmation is lacking.
This point is further strengthened by the fact that the distinction between
cases of empirical confirmation and theory assessment without empirical con-
firmation is not a rigid dichotomy. One might rather speak of a slippery
slope that leads from empirical to non-empirical confirmation. String the-
ory is indeed the only case where a theory is supported by MEC that does
not reproduce any specific quantitative empirical predictions that go beyond
general characteristics such as the existence of gravity or signatures that re-
flect symmetry features of a gauge field theory. In more conventional cases of
NAA, the theories under scrutiny do make predictions that agree with em-
pirical data even though its core predictions remain empirically unconfirmed.
Examples of such cases would be NAA type arguments for the Higgs particle
before its discovery in 2012 (Dawid 2013), for inflation (Dawid and McCoy
forthcoming), for dark matter (Allzèn forthcoming), or, as a historical exam-
7A core example of Chang is the endorsement of Lavoisier’s theory of combustion of
phlogiston theory.
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ple, the arguments in favor of an atomist explanation of isomers in the 1870s
(Dawid 2020).
In all those cases, there is empirical data that can be represented by the
given theory: Flatness, Isotropy and CMB precision data in the case of in-
flation, rotation curves of galaxies and clusters in the case of dark matter,
the existence of particle mass spectra that obey standard model symmetries
in the case of the Higgs particle and the spectrum of isomers in 19th century
chemistry. MEC applies because the theory’s core posits, the Higgs par-
ticle,the fields that drive inflation, dark matter particles, or the individual
molecules, have not been observed. On the other hand, there are cases of em-
pirical confirmation where a considerable theoretical distance separates the
observed data from the theory. A good example is the confirmation of the
hypothesis of a cosmological constant by standard candle supernovae data
(Perlmutter 1999, Riess 1999). In all those cases, whether they are cases
of empirical or non-empirical confirmation, NAA generates trust in theories
that, to some extent, are supported by empirical data. It seems arbitrary to
confine the legitimate role of NAA only to the case of the cosmological con-
stant that, on most accounts, qualifies as a case of empirical confirmation.
Once the legitimacy of MEC has been accepted for all cases listed in this
paragraph, however, it would seem arbitrary to block it only in the case of
string theory.
Oriti makes the point that, even in cases where NAA is used by expo-
nents of a theory, the claim that there are no viable alternatives will not
be universally accepted. This seems to be a fair point. But, once again,
the situation differs only gradually from many cases of empirically confirmed
hypotheses. Supernovae data is by a majority of physicists today taken to
provide empirical confirmation of accelerated expansion and, on that basis,
for a cosmological constant. Nevertheless, more than 20 years after the data
has been gathered, alternative hypotheses to the cosmological constant are
being upheld (such as quintessence (see e.g. Tsujikawa 213) or modified
gravity (see e.g. Baker et al. 2013)) and even papers doubting accelerated
expansion (Nielsen et al. 2016)) are being published. It would be an inade-
quate to claim that data can empirically confirm a hypothesis only once the
last scientific supporter of an alternative hypothesis has changed her mind
or died. Rather, it is up to the individual scientist to make a judgement,
based on applying scientific methodology, whether the given data should be
acknowledged as substantial confirmation of a hypothesis or not.
The very same assessment is applicable to the use of of NAA in the case of
MEC. Oriti correctly points out that methodological preferences (see Section
4) or judgements of elegance or simplicity are no reliable basis for MEC.
However, other complex issues require individual assessment as well and are
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of crucial importance for the question as to whether or not a theory should
be viewed as a genuine scientific alternative at a given point. Important
examples are a theory’s prospects of internal consistency or its prospects to
be consistent with empirical data. Scientists may differ in their judgements
of those issues, which may legitimately lead them towards different views on
a NAA in a given case. Obviously, science should strive to find convergence
on those issues to the extent possible. It would not be justified, however,
to conclude that a failure to find full agreement implies that the arguments
involved lack all epistemic merit.
Finally, Oriti argues that NAA has a detrimental effect on the research
process by reducing theory pluralism. Oriti is no doubt right that widespread
NAA-based trust in a theory can discourage research work on alternative
research programs. As discussed above, this effect can be constructive in
bundling efforts where research seems most promising but can also be detri-
mental to scientific progress by discouraging alternative research strategies
that could be successful in the end.
The following point is important to emphasize, however. Developing a
full understanding of the mechanism of MEC does not devaluate the push
towards theory proliferation but actually provides an additional powerful
reason for pursuing alternative research programs. NAA depends on the
observation that scientists have extensively and over long periods of time
searched for alternatives but did not come up with any. Only on that basis
can a NAA be significant. The more energy has been invested in alternative
research programs without success, the more powerful a NAA can become.
In this light, it is in the epistemic interest of the dominant research program
that alternative research programs are pursued with vigor and in sufficient
breadth. This is particularly true in research contexts where prospects of
empirical confirmation are scarce and theory assessment must be expected
to depend on MEC for many years to come.
Working on alternative research programs in a context of scarce or in-
conclusive empirical evidence thus is of crucial importance irrespectively of
the eventual success of that program. If the program ends up being suc-
cessful, it directly contributes to scientific progress. If it is unsuccessful and
another research program ends up being supported by MEC, the unsuccess-
ful programs are essential for developing a NAA in support of the successful
theory, thereby making an epistemically important contribution to the sci-
entific process as well. Proliferation in this light is not the enemy of NAA
but an essential ally.
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6 Conclusion
All three lines of criticism addressed in this note raise relevant and impor-
tant issues. Answering them was based on pointing out that significant
meta-empirical confirmation involves a number of conceptually non-trivial
elements. All three arguments of meta-empirical confirmation rely on the
careful distinction between local and global claims and on the specific status
of meta-level observations. The NAA needs to be based on the specification of
the intended empirical domain rather than on methodological or conceptual
requirements. Finally, NAA crucially depends on a powerful push towards
theory proliferation. Whether and to what extent significant MEC can be
achieved in the end depends on the specific characteristics of the individ-
ual scientific case. I hope to have demonstrated, though, that none of the
lines of criticism discussed threaten the conceptual core of meta-empirical
confirmation.
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